Almost every program that we run has access to the environment, so nothing stops them from curling our credentials to some nefarious server.

Why don’t we put credentials in files and then pass them to the programs that need them? Maybe coupled with some mechanism that prevents executables from reading any random file except those approved.

  • @[email protected]
    70•11 months ago

    Environments are per-process. Every program can have its own environment, so don’t inject secrets where they’re not needed.

    I’m using bubblewrap to restrict access to FS.

    • @[email protected]
      36•11 months ago

      I am not familiar with the software bubblewrap so I am just picturing your hard drives wrapped up inside your case.

    • @[email protected]
      21•11 months ago

      The environment of other processes is readable in procfs.

      /proc/PID/environ

      Thanks to the permissions it’s read-only, and only by the user with which the process runs, but it’s still bad, I think

            • @fahfahfahfahAEnglish
              7•11 months ago

              Service users generally don’t have passwords

            • lemmyvoreEnglish
              3•11 months ago

              You don’t login as service users, they’re just a means of taking advantage of the user separation features. They have the login shell set to /bin/false typically.

                • @[email protected]English
                  3•11 months ago

                  From a quick search I’ve just done, the major difference is that /bin/false can’t return any text, the only thing it can do as specified via POSIX standards is return false.

                  So if you set someone’s shell to /bin/nologin there can be some text that says “You’re not allowed shell access”, similar to what happens if you try to SSH into say GitHub.

                  Of course, for a service account that won’t be operated by a person, that doesn’t matter - so whichever one you use is just whichever the operator thought of first, most likely.